



see money differently

A photograph of an open book with white pages, tied with a white string, set against a light background.

Nedgroup Investments Global Equity Fund

Quarter One, 2026

Marketing Communication



Nedgroup Investments Global Equity Fund

1. Market Overview and Outlook

"Risk means more things can happen than will happen."

- Elroy Dimson

With oil prices rising 93% in the first 3 months of 2026, it is unsurprising that energy and defence equities were the better performing parts of a stock market that declined -165bps in sterling (-357bps in USD). Indeed, Fatih Birol, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, believes that we have been teetering on the brink of the largest disruption in the history of the global oil market. Prior to the recent ceasefire (as of 8th April) global supply losses had reached 12m barrels per day in comparison to the 5m barrel per day losses experienced in the 1970s. When an essential commodity like oil is suddenly in short supply prices will typically surge until sufficient demand is destroyed to bring the market back into balance. Fear of the profoundly negative economic consequences of a surging oil price precipitated March's record-breaking coordinated release of 400 million barrels of crude oil from strategic reserves from the 32 IEA (International Energy Agency) member countries.

Will the cease fire in the Strait of Hormuz now last or will it breakdown leading to further disruption? How quickly can supply normalise? How does one guard against the competing risks of inflation and recession? Peter Lynch was famous for saying that "If you spend 13 minutes a year on economics, you've wasted 10 minutes". He wasn't making the point that macro economics is unimportant, but that it is impossible to forecast and so as equity investors our time is better spent focussing on the outlook for the businesses we own. We tend to agree but would also add that it is important to build a portfolio of businesses that are, in aggregate, resilient to the vicissitudes of an uncertain future. Our answer has been to own a portfolio of predominantly recession resilient, low leverage, high return, conservatively valued equities that have a demonstrated ability to capture inflation and reliably grow over time. And yet the Veritas Global Focus Fund fell 1116bps in Q126 (USD terms), underperforming the market and absolute return benchmark, which is disappointing.

Over the last 12 months "Hard Assets, Low Obsolesce" equities have been the answer and one can understand why, given their intuitive appeal: there is no risk of AI disruption (or disruption narrative!), windfall profits are being made on oil reserves and demand for memory chip fabrication and electricity generation is seemingly insatiable. Those investors who have bought these businesses below their replacement cost and waited patiently for the cycle to turn deserve the returns they are enjoying today. However, over the long term we believe these types of assets do a poor job of preserving wealth. Not only are they often highly cyclical and mean reverting in nature, but inflation has a highly deleterious impact on capital intense balance sheets and thus ability to generate free cashflow.

This is perhaps best understood by thinking about the consequences of rising oil prices on a theoretical oil producer with one year of reserves. As the oil price rises, revenue increases and the producer starts to make windfall profits. Return on capital rises. With a lag, taxes, extraction and processing costs start to rise and dilute profits, but the real damage is done when the oil producer tries to replace their reserves and finds that assets have all become more expensive. They have to spend all their windfall cashflows replacing reserves at new and inflated prices.

This process carries on until prices start to fall and the capital misallocation of reserves replaced at unsustainable prices becomes apparent.

In his seminal 1977 article "How inflation swindles the equity investor", Warren Buffett makes the point that general inflation does not lead to structural improvements in return on capital. As nominal profits rise during periods of inflation so does the balance sheet cost of generating those profits, both in terms of working capital requirements and maintenance CAPEX. The lower the starting return on invested capital the more cashflow is consumed growing the balance sheet, as illustrated by this example of See's Candy vs a mundane cost of capital type business:





	See's Candy	Mundane business
Starting year		
Earnings	2	2
Invested Capital	8	18
ROIC	25%	11%
<hr/>		
EV	25	18
P/E	12.5	9.0
<hr/>		
Post Inflation		
Earnings	4	4
Invested Capital	16	36
ROIC	25%	11%
<hr/>		
EV	50	36
P/E	12.5	9.0
<hr/>		
Valuation gain	25	18
Investment	8	18
Years of NOPLAT	4	9

Source: Berkshire Hathaway Chairman's letters; VAM analysis

It is this enduring aspect of “quality,” that is, the ability to grow without substantial reinvestment that we are trying to harness in our investment process. In his book “Simple but not Easy”, Richard Oldfield makes the point that the core principles of successful investing are easy to understand but exceptionally hard to implement due to the psychological difficulty of staying the course when it isn’t working.

Today, we see many market participants struggling to stay the course with “quality” investing given its lacklustre performance over the last couple of years and the seemingly easy money being made elsewhere. When we look at the bargain valuations in our portfolio we can’t help but think that, ultimately, their loss will be our gain. One such example of this type of opportunity is Compass Group.

Compass Group

The company is by some distance the world’s largest contract caterer and embodies most of the abovementioned characteristics we seek in our investee companies. It serves a multitude of client groups including corporate workplaces, sports and leisure venues, education, healthcare and senior living.

The business operates within a vast Total Addressable Market (TAM) of \$360bn that is in aggregate mature, growing in the low single digits most years. Around 55-60% has been outsourced while the remaining 40-45% is carried out in-house. Thanks to economies of scale and expertise honed over decades, Compass can typically offer better service levels at 15-20% less cost. The company effectively ‘shares the gains’ with their customers and provides it a durable, execution driven, moat. Prior to Covid-19, the overall rate of outsourcing rose steadily, but since the pandemic, the rate of “first time outsourcing” has accelerated as employers grapple with less predictable work patterns, higher cost inflation and increasingly varied and complex dietary requirements. We therefore expect outsourced revenue to grow at around mid-single digits for the foreseeable future. Of the 55-60% that has already been outsourced, Compass has a low to mid-teens share while ~30% is held by small regional operators. The latter serve as a steady source of share gains for Compass, which aims to grow its revenues organically in the mid to high single digits for the foreseeable future, higher than the ~5% it typically delivered before Covid.

We believe Compass has two sources of competitive advantage:





1. Local scale: Catering is mostly a national industry; a large presence in one region confers like benefit elsewhere. Three-quarters of Compass' profits are generated in North America where it is approximately 2.5 times the size of its nearest competitor. Food and materials represent approximately one-third of costs and here Compass can benefit from economies of scale. Scale is also an advantage in Compass' vending business, where route density is the primary determinant of profitability, and in technology investments.
2. Culture and process: Compass has spent two decades following and refining a simple but effective operating model which essentially requires all actions taken by employees either help drive higher revenues or reduce unit costs. Unlike peers, it also goes to market with sector-specific brands rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. The CFO has said "this business is all about marginal gains" and we believe Compass consistently does many small things better than competitors. Over time, the compounding effect of this is enormous and demonstrated through consistently faster organic growth, higher margins and higher client retention than peers.

We think Compass is a reasonably defensive and predictable business in almost all economic environments. Organic growth was flat in its worst year of the Global Financial Crisis (2009) and it operates under contracts that are usually 3-7 years along and 96% annual client retention. It has ably managed higher input cost inflation in recent years, typically passing two-thirds of this on to customers and offsetting the remainder by adjusting menus, for example.

Despite delivering solid fundamentals, the stock has meaningfully underperformed over the past year due to valuation de-rating. At peak, it traded at 26x prospective earnings, and this has fallen to 18x at the time of writing. The current rating is around the levels where Compass traded in the years before Covid when organic growth was lower. We believe there are two explanations:

1. Concerns that AI will displace large swathes of white-collar workers; these present 20-25% of Compass revenues; and
2. A de-rating of "classic defensive" businesses like Compass whose growth prospects look less exciting than hotter parts of the market (for now).

For several reasons, we think the AI risk is likely overstated. Even if, say, 20% of the white-collar workers served by Compass were lost over five years, this would be only a ~100bps group revenue headwind, all else equal. However, history suggests from technological revolutions emerge new types of employment; admittedly, in the case of AI we don't yet know what those might be but from Compass' perspective, it matters only that people continue going to work. We think a pertinent analogy is that the US lost 6m manufacturing jobs from 2000-2010 but overall employment increased. Finally, we also highlight that previous employment dislocations (such as the GFC and Covid) have typically led to accelerated first time outsourcing.

As for the second explanation, we have no idea when sentiment might change but strongly believe time is the friend of good businesses like Compass. We expect it to consistently deliver ~10% EPS growth plus a 2.5% dividend yield with a high-teens ROIC and modest financial leverage. The longer one's time horizon, the more certain it is that share price performance will reflect underlying fundamentals and on this basis are happy to await gratification.

Performance

In Q1 the fund fell 11.8% in USD underperforming the MSCI World Index, which saw a 3.5% decline. The performance was driven by the fund's exposure to aerospace and a lack of energy investments, which had an impact given recent geopolitical events. A secondary factor has been continuing headwinds to quality, driven in part by a perceived threat to asset light businesses from AI. The fund has highly durable and resilient business models and the current valuation levels in several holdings are at or near their lowest levels over the last decade. Whilst we are disappointed with near term performance, the fund continues to hold strongly moated businesses with highly attractive valuations, positioning the strategy to deliver strong risk adjusted returns going forward. At present we see a historically high aggregate internal rate of return on the portfolio.





2. Fund performance contributors & detractors for past quarter

Past performance is not indicative of future performance and does not predict future return.

Top 5 Contributors & Bottom 5 Detractors

Holding	Portfolio			Index			Attribution
	Average Weight	Total Return	Absolute Contribution	Average Weight	Total Return	Absolute Contribution	Total Effect
Top 5 relative stock contributors							
Canadian Pacific Kansas City	4.7	7.0	0.3	0.1	6.6	0.0	0.5
Vinci	5.5	5.0	0.2	0.1	4.9	0.0	0.4
Waters Corporation	3.2	8.9	0.3	0.0	-21.6	-0.0	0.4
ASML Holding N.V.	2.2	20.0	0.3	0.6	19.3	0.1	0.3
Charter Communications	2.2	3.2	0.1	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.1
Bottom 5 relative stock contributors							
Salesforce	3.8	-29.6	-1.2	0.2	-29.5	-0.1	-1.1
Amadeus IT Holding	3.5	-23.5	-0.9	0.0	-23.5	-0.0	-0.8
Airbus	4.3	-20.5	-1.0	0.2	-20.5	-0.0	-0.7
Becton Dickinson	4.2	-18.7	-0.8	0.1	2.4	0.0	-0.7
Dassault Systemes SE	2.2	-29.0	-0.7	0.0	-28.9	-0.0	-0.6

Investment results shown total return, gross of fees and expenses in USD. Source: Veritas Asset Management/FactSet

Index is the MSCI World Index with net dividends reinvested in USD. Source: MSCI/FactSet

Portfolio Attribution Commentary

Contributors

Canadian Pacific (CPKC). As the only single-line rail network connecting Canada, the U.S., and Mexico, CPKC capitalised on nearshoring trends and increasing manufacturing in Mexico. This unique footprint allowed them to capture intermodal business that truck-competitive services offer. The railway's Mexico Midwest Express flagship intermodal service, which links Chicago with points in Mexico, continues to grow, with volume up 40% year over year in the fourth quarter. CPKC will launch dedicated intermodal trains connecting Mexico and Dallas with Atlanta, Charlotte, N.C., and Jacksonville, Fla. CPKC is in talks with one domestic intermodal customer who plans on using the service for up to 80,000 loads per year, which translates into 219 containers per day. In its quarterly earnings, the company announced operating income rose 3%, as revenue increased 1%, and earnings per share increased 3%. CPKC maintained strong growth in key areas such as grain, potash, and intermodal, which helped offset weaker performance in industrial-focused sectors. U.S. tariffs continue to weigh on CPKC's Canadian forest products traffic as well as cross-border steel shipments to the U.S. The largely completed integration of Kansas City Southern (KCS) enabled structural synergies, allowing the company to improve its operating ratio and control costs, strengthening its credit profile. The quarter saw a record operating ratio. As well as benefitting from a growing onshoring trend, CPKC has a 'Ready to Grow' growth strategy, a multi-year approach aimed at leveraging the unique, single-line, three-country rail network created by the Canadian Pacific and Kansas City Southern merger. A cornerstone of the strategy involves establishing "Site Ready" locations across North America that feature pre-existing, built-in rail access. These sites offer faster project development times for customers needing to build near major transportation hubs. In early 2026, the company certified 14 new "Site Ready" industrial locations. These sites target underpenetrated corridors in the US South and Mexico, key for capturing truck-to-rail shifts. Potash and LPG flows stand to benefit most from this north-south connectivity. Expansion supports durable volume growth, with Mexico's manufacturing boom driving intermodal demand. This certification is part of the company's broader Room to Grow commercial strategy to attract manufacturers, logistics operators, and supply chain partners to its network. Six states in the US, three Canadian provinces, and two Mexican states host these development sites. They collectively unlock more than 6,600 acres of immediately developable land. This means that businesses can break ground without waiting through the lengthy pre-permitting and rail connection approval process that typically adds months to industrial project timelines. This announcement more than doubles CPKC's existing footprint in the Room to Grow program. The railway now counts 22 certified sites across its tri-national network. The "Room to Grow"





strategy also integrates environmental goals, such as the deployment of hydrogen-powered locomotives, and technological advancements like AI-driven maintenance to improve efficiency and reduce the operating ratio.

Vinci rose significantly in February 2026, primarily due to the company reporting record-breaking free cash flow and a strong outlook in its 2025 annual results. Vinci achieved an all-time high free cash flow of €7.01 billion in 2025, significantly exceeding expectations. The company proposed a dividend of €5.00 per share for 2025, a 5.3% increase from the previous year's €4.75. Growth was supported by high-margin concessions, especially Vinci Airports with an EBITDA margin of 67% and strong momentum in Energy Solutions. Traffic was dynamic at most airports in the network: 334 million passengers used the airports managed by the Group in 2025, which was 5.0% more than in 2024. There were large increases at recently acquired airports (Budapest, Edinburgh, Mexico and Cabo Verde), and in Japan. VINCI's Energy Solutions business is emerging as a major growth driver and operates in very buoyant markets - shift towards electrification, rapid growth for AI and data centres, digitalisation of industrial processes and building management, and defence and sovereignty challenges. Order intake in its Cobra IS (energy infrastructure and engineering) totalled €8.6 billion and exceeded Cobra IS's revenue in 2025. The order book at 31 December 2025 amounted to €18.1 billion, up 3% year on year, and represents more than two years of Cobra IS's average business activity. In mobility infrastructure, VINCI concluded with the competent authorities' important agreements that provide greater visibility on the contracts as well as promising growth prospects: in France with Cofiroute's additional investment plan of €350 million of investments to be made on the intercity network. These investments mainly cover projects for shared mobility, electric transport facilities, environmental integration and land-use planning; in the UK the plan to convert London Gatwick airport's Northern Runway to enable dual usage with the main runway was approved by the UK authorities. Its conversion will increase the airport's capacity at the turn of the next decade, bringing it to 80 million passengers; in Mexico with the approval of the Master Development Program for OMA's airports, which dictates the investments made over 5 years. This contractual dynamic is in line with VINCI's strategy of creating value in its long-term activities. VINCI's international footprint now generates almost 60% of its revenue and over 50% of its net income.

Waters Corporation shares fell during Q1 but were a net positive contributor as the position was significantly increased at the lows. The standalone Waters results were solid but the company announced that the business it acquired from Becton Dickinson (BD) showed up weaker than expected in Q4, and Waters is now guiding to a low-single-digit revenue decline for the BD assets in Q1 2026. Waters' standalone business produced revenue and EPS growth that exceeded expectations, with LC-MS (liquid chromatography and mass spectrometry) instruments growing at high-single-digit rates in every quarter of 2025, chemistry consumables grew 12% for the year, and the company's idiosyncratic growth drivers, GLP-1s, PFAS testing and Indian generics, all showing positive momentum. GLP-1 testing-related revenue more than doubled reflecting continued wins in development and manufacturing settings in the Americas and Europe, along with expanding demand from generic semaglutide manufacturing buildouts in India. Waters is basically benefiting from the demand for GLPs and is indifferent as to who the winners in this space will be. They all need the equipment it produces. Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) growth also remains robust, with orders growing approximately 30%. PFAS are a large class of thousands of synthetic chemicals that are used throughout society. However, they are increasingly detected as environmental pollutants and some are linked to negative effects on human health. An example of strong demand was from Japan as labs prepare for new drinking water regulations. India delivered excellent performance, with revenue up high teens driven by strong demand from generics manufacturers and CDMOs (Contract Development Manufacturers), as Waters continues to benefit from volume growth trends tied to the ongoing patent cliff of blockbuster drugs. As drugs go off patent, generics can be produced cheaply, and at the same time the search for replacements via pre- and post-clinical development and manufacturing applications of novel large molecule therapeutics increases. This issue in the short term has been the Becton acquired Life sciences business, which makes longer term strategic sense, but is suffering from a number of shorter-term headwinds. First is weakened demand tied to China's drug regulatory group (DRG) reforms. Second, a higher prior-year baseline inflated by one-time intellectual property revenue. Third, a mild flu season that slowed point-of-care testing volumes. And fourth, delayed export approvals to China caused by the U.S. federal government shutdown. Three of the four are already lapping out of the baseline by Q1, with the DRG headwind the exception, which won't fully realise until late Q3. The BD business should return to growth over the course of 2026.

ASML reported a massive AI-Driven order book, with record net bookings of €13.2 billion in the reporting quarter significantly exceeding market expectations and highlighting intense demand for its extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography systems. AI remains the biggest long-term driver, and recent industry news supports that view. Key customer TSMC indicated a strong capex outlook for 2026 to expand 2nm capacity, SK Hynix's \$7.97 billion tool order and imec's installation of a rare \$400 million High NA EUV machine both point to continued spending on





leading-edge chips for AI and high-bandwidth memory growth. ASML expects 2026 total net sales of €34 billion to €39 billion and gross margin of 51% to 53%. The company also ended 2025 with a €38.8 billion backlog, so the debate is not whether demand exists, but how quickly that backlog converts into shipped systems and recognised revenue. An anticipated 40-50% rise in memory prices in Q1 2026 spurred increased orders from major manufacturers like Samsung and SK Hynix for DRAM chip production. There was some profit taking late in the quarter when Google unveiled TurboQuant, a compression algorithm that it said can reduce AI memory use without hurting performance. ASML has always managed to stay ahead of the competition and began scaling its next-generation High-Numerical Aperture (High-NA) EUV machines, which cost over \$400 million per unit and bolster revenue per system. EUV machines are so critical to chip production that the U.S. government has worked with Dutch leaders to prevent them from being shipped to China. Both China and the US have national efforts to build machines of their own. In the United States, at least two startups, Substrate and xLight, have raised hundreds of millions of dollars to develop American competitors to ASML's technology, with xLight securing government funding from President Donald Trump's administration. ASML aims to outdistance any would-be rivals by improving the most technologically challenging aspect of its machines. The company say they have found a way to boost the power of the light source to turn out up to 50% more chips by the end of the decade. This is the quest to generate EUV light with the right power and properties to turn out chips at high volume. The company's researchers have found a way to boost the power of the EUV light source to 1,000 watts from 600 watts now. The chief advantage is that greater power translates into the ability to make more chips every hour, helping to lower the cost of each. Chips are printed similar to a photograph, where the EUV light is shone on a silicon wafer coated with special chemicals called a photoresist. With a more powerful EUV light source, chip factories need shorter exposure times. Customers should be able to process about 330 silicon wafers an hour on each machine by the end of the decade, up from 220 now. Depending on the size of a chip, each wafer can hold up to thousands of the devices. To produce light with a wavelength of 13.5 nanometers, ASML's machine shoots a stream of molten droplets of tin through a chamber, where a massive carbon dioxide laser heats them into plasma. This is a superheated state of matter in which the tin droplets become hotter than the sun and emit EUV light, to be collected by precision optic equipment supplied by Germany's Carl Zeiss AG and fed into the machine to print chips. The key advancements involved doubling the number of tin drops to about 100,000 every second and shaping them into plasma using two smaller laser bursts, as opposed to today's machines that use a single shaping burst. Magic!

Charter Communications shares have been under pressure due to persistent competitive pressures from fibre and fixed-wireless access (FWA). These businesses rely on spare mobile capacity and Charter reported fewer internet customer losses in early 2026 than was expected, which may indicate that the intense, competitive erosion of its customer base might be moderating. The company also reported a slowdown in video decline (the trend has been to 'cut the cord' and watch streaming services). In addition, Charter continued to aggressively grow its Spectrum Mobile line count, adding around 500,000 lines in the first quarter. This strong mobile momentum helped to offset broadband pressure and provided a positive for EBITDA growth. Management has been using its robust cash flow to buy back shares.

The company's strategic initiatives, including rural buildouts, bundling of internet/mobile services, and improved service offerings, offer a significant "turnaround" narrative. Spectrum's multi-year rural construction initiative is driven by more than \$7 billion in private investment from Spectrum and will ultimately add an additional 100,000+ miles of fibre network infrastructure and deliver symmetrical and multi-gigabit speeds to more than 1.7 million new locations across the country.

Since 2016, Charter has retired over half its shares outstanding, and as prices trade lower, the pace of this compounding machine only accelerates. The market is currently pricing in a "price war" that is unlikely to materialise. Telecom giants like AT&T and Verizon are weighed under massive debt loads while attempting to overbuild fibre in regions where Charter already owns the customer relationship. These entrants cannot logically underprice Charter after paying exorbitant installation costs for rural fibre. As the Network Evolution (a multi-year, \$12 billion (as of 2025) strategic initiative to upgrade its Spectrum network for increased speed and reliability), and rural builds wind down after 2025, capital spending will drop by roughly \$4 billion annually. This flows directly to free cash flow yield that could potentially double by 2030 from an already high level (14%).





Detractors

Salesforce reported strong earnings, with \$11.20 billion revenue in the quarter, and adjusted earnings of \$3.81 per share, higher than the expected \$3.04. Revenue grew 12% year-over-year, which is the fastest growth in two years. Net income rose to \$1.94 billion from \$1.71 billion last year. The stock came under pressure from a weak 2027 forecast and heavy AI spending. Salesforce thinks it will make about \$45.8 billion to \$46.2 billion in revenue. This is a little less than the \$46.06 billion that was expected. There is concern amongst investors that demand is weak because companies are cutting tech spending due to global economic uncertainty. The argument is that businesses are now spending only on essential software and cost-cutting tools. Pressure from competitors like Microsoft Dynamics 365 and ServiceNow is cited as contributing to pricing pressures and reduced average selling prices, although, five customers of ServiceNow switched to Salesforce products during the quarter. In addition, investors are also worried because Salesforce is spending billions on AI technology, which will take years to bear fruit. Salesforce is strongly pushing its Agentforce AI technology to automate customer service work. Annual revenue from Agentforce AI crossed \$800 million but is clearly at the early stages. There is fear that new AI startups could disrupt traditional software companies. Despite short-term worries, Salesforce raised its long-term 2030 revenue target to \$63 billion. The company also announced a huge \$50 billion share buyback plan.

It has been a brutal Q1 for software companies, as period investors have dubbed it "SaaSocalypse", but there is a misinterpretation of the risks. The key is that the "System of Record", where the data lives, is the ultimate moat. AI agents are only as good as the data they can access, which is why the legacy giants who hold that data will win in the transition.

This potential is fuelled by a structural pivot from "assistive" AI to "agentic" AI, where software no longer just helps humans work but performs the work autonomously. The age-old "seat-based" licensing model, which tethered software revenue to human headcount, is dying. In its place, a new monetisation architecture based on "Agentic Work Units" and "Performance Credits" has emerged. This shift has decoupled growth from hiring trends, allowing enterprise software companies to report accelerating revenue even where their customers streamline their human workforces. The market is no longer taxing the worker; it is taxing the work. Investors realised that while "Copilots" were helpful, they were ultimately cannibalistic to the seat-based model. If an AI tool made a marketing manager five times more productive, the customer needed four fewer marketing managers, and therefore, four fewer software licenses. This "seat compression" has contributed to the fall in software shares. Salesforce reported strong Q4 earnings that defied the contraction narrative. The key was the rapid deployment of autonomous agents. Unlike the previous chatbots, these 'Agentforce bots', possess the reasoning capabilities to resolve customer disputes, qualify leads, and manage supply chains without human intervention. By the end of Q1 2026, CIO adoption of agentic production environments had skyrocketed by 280% year-over-year. Investors should consider the "Rule of 50", measuring the sum of revenue growth and free cash flow margin (needs to be 50% or higher), reflecting a market that values efficiency as much as expansion. The primary winners of this are the incumbents who control the enterprise data layer. Salesforce has introduced "Agentic Work Units" (AWUs), charging customers roughly \$2.00 per autonomous action. This move has allowed them to capture value directly from the productivity gains they provide, rather than waiting for a customer to hire more employees.

Amadeus IT Group declined significantly in the first quarter of 2026, despite reporting strong full-year 2025 results in late February. AI displacement fears, which caused a broader market sell-off in software tech was driven by concerns that artificial intelligence could allow smaller competitors to create cheaper alternatives, leading to increased pricing pressure on Amadeus. The argument is that this comes at a time when revenue growth in the core Air Distribution segment is "normalising" as global travel volumes drop, following the post-pandemic recovery peak. In March, there is clearly the added concern that air travel, especially business, will be impacted by the Middle East conflict.

Amadeus provides software solutions and services to the global travel and tourism industry. The company is one of the world's leading providers of Global Distribution Systems [GDS]. GDS connects travel service providers with travel agencies and booking sites. Beyond GDS, Amadeus also provides mission-critical software-as-a-service (SaaS) technology to airlines, focusing on automating passenger service systems (PSS), reservation management, inventory, and departure control. The company is currently migrating its applications to the public cloud, allowing for better scalability. Furthermore, the company has a new strategic partnership with Google to explore AI-driven solutions to enhance IT systems, and Amadeus is already porting its first airline customers to its next-generation airline IT platform called Nevio. Nevio builds on a modular, cloud-native setup and allows for the implementation of AI. The company is also attempting to capture a bigger market share in





Hospital & Other Solutions, which provides it with revenue streams besides airline-focused GDS and IT systems. The perceived risk is that AI may reconfigure how purchasing travel and lodging happens. However, AI may strengthen data-rich participants in the industry with deep ecosystem integration. AI opportunities include agentic AI embedded in existing workflows, and Amadeus, through its GDS database, has a lot of operational data, and the value of AI scales strongest when there is a lot of operational data that can be leveraged. The company identified 500+ potential use cases for AI. One of the solutions is the Cytric Easy AI assistant, allowing employees to book corporate travel through the Microsoft Teams app.

Airline IT is complex and these systems are highly complex to implement into an operational airline, and thus switching costs are high. This means that Airline IT revenues are sticky and guarded through long-term contracts and high switching costs. Secondly, GDS is not a front-end system that can be removed by AI platforms. The core value is the database aggregated by Amadeus. AI platforms currently are not connecting directly to, for instance, the dataset of an airline. They still rely on booking through a system that relies on Amadeus' GDS. Chances are also not huge that in the near term this will change, because in order to disintermediate, Amadeus AI platforms would need to connect with every airline for their data, set up pricing rules and fare logic, and do the booking execution. Amadeus does all of that. AI in its current form would not replace the core systems of Amadeus and setting up a replacement infrastructure (meaning replacing the GDS) is an effort that would likely take years. In those years, Amadeus can inject AI into its systems, and it has already started with that: the company's new cloud-native Nevio Airline IT system on which AI can be leveraged to optimize revenues. That means Amadeus controls the infrastructure from Airline IT to the front-end part of the GDS. Amadeus is at the risk that front-end use gets replaced by AI agents. However, AI would increase the demand for infrastructure, not remove it. Due to the complexity and sheer amount of data that Amadeus aggregates, the company has opportunities to sell API licenses to access the data. So, the revenue opportunity is an Amadeus API layer that third-party AI agents connect to and, given that AI can compare hundreds of flights instead of humans comparing just a handful of flights, the number of API tokens consumed would also increase. So, as long as Amadeus makes its own AI integrations and agents, it can limit competition from third-party AI agents. However, even if it does happen, Amadeus has the data and network moat it can leverage and turn into a new API revenue opportunity, which will likely see scaled usage. In short, the fear of disintermediation is completely overblown if you consider that Amadeus IT Group provides the informing data and aggregation layer below AI, and there is no sign currently that any AI platform will take on the challenge to build a competing data aggregation and processing layer that will compete with Amadeus. At the same time, Amadeus is developing tools to leverage AI.

Airbus reported good numbers with full-year revenue rising 6% to €73.4bn, reflecting growth across all divisions, including double-digit increases in its Helicopters and Defence and Space businesses. Commercial aircraft deliveries totalled 793 for 2025 which was an increase from 766 in 2024. Underlying operating profit rose 33% to €7.1 billion (£6.9 billion expected), with the uplift driven by a sharp return to profitability in the Defence & Space division which had previously been a drag for Airbus. Free cash flow improved from €4.5 billion to €4.6 billion, and net cash position rose from €11.8 billion to €12.2 billion. It was guidance that was poorly received, with Airbus expecting to deliver around 870 commercial aircraft (whilst an increase over previous year, down from 907 previously guided), and underlying operating profits and free cash flow now expected to land at around €7.5 billion and €4.5 billion respectively, lower than expected but based on less aircraft deliveries. Another headwind has been the perceived impact that the Middle East conflict may have on travel related businesses. Airbus has been having issues with one of its engine suppliers, Pratt & Whitney. Pratt & Whitney has had to ground hundreds of planes to check for potential damage caused by contaminated powdered metal it used in geared turbo fan engines over a six-year period, which can cause some cracking. The problem has forced airlines such as Wizz Air (WIZZ) to take dozens of aircraft out of service while checks are made, with Pratt & Whitney then compensating the airline for loss of revenue. As a result, Pratt & Whitney want to allocate a large part of their efforts to the existing fleet rather than send engines to Airbus to install in new planes. Airbus predominantly uses Safran engines, like LEAP, but there is clearly an impact. The target to reach a production rate of 75 A320-family aircraft per month was pushed back from the end of 2026 to 2027. In terms of the Middle East impact, this is likely overblown. Market dynamics are very favourable given it is dominated by just two companies, with the split standing at roughly 60/40 in Airbus/Boeing. Demand is strong as airlines try to upgrade their fleets after years of COVID-19 underinvestment and wish to replace with more energy efficient planes (something likely to accelerate post current oil price pressure). As a result, the order backlog rose to 8,754 aircraft. That's more than 11 times the number of planes Airbus delivered in the whole of 2025, giving the group great revenue visibility. About 9% of Airbus's total aircraft backlog is tied to Middle Eastern airlines and lessors. Deliveries scheduled for the next 18 months are considered most at risk if regional instability persists. There are "small but credible" risks to regional supply chain and maintenance (MRO) hubs clustered around Middle Eastern airports, which have increasingly become targets in the conflict. While the manufacturer is shielded by





a diverse global supplier network, its airline customers in the region have been hit harder by flight cancellations (over 37,000) and soaring jet fuel prices. The Defence and Space division of Airbus also offers some diversification from its commercial aircraft operations. After a tough period of write-downs, performance has picked up significantly, and the division is back to turning a profit. With Europe looking to ramp up its defence spending in the coming years, Airbus looks well-placed to deal with the shifting landscape and increasing demand.

Shares of **Becton Dickinson** (BD) performed poorly in early 2026, despite exceeding Q1 financial expectations. The negative market reaction was driven by a downward revision of their full-year 2026 profit outlook and concerns over margin pressures, rather than the quarterly results themselves. BD significantly lowered its 2026 adjusted profit forecast to a range of \$12.35 to \$12.65 per share, which was well below the analyst consensus of roughly \$14.72 to \$14.94. However, the main reason for the revision was to reflect the finalisation of the deal to spin off its Biosciences and Diagnostic Solutions business to Waters Corporation. BD reached a \$17.5 billion agreement to merge the unit with Waters Corporation, a laboratory equipment maker, in July 2025 and announced the deal's formal completion alongside its Q1 2026 financials. BD received \$4 billion in cash from the transaction, which it plans to allocate equally toward share repurchases and debt reduction. The spin-off transferred 39.2% ownership of the combined entity to BD shareholders. BD has divested three non-core businesses and executed more than 20 tuck-in acquisitions to sharpen its focus on its high-margin Medical and Interventional segments. The main growth areas for the company going forward, driven by its BD2025 and emerging BD2030 strategies, are focused on connected care, biologic drug delivery, interventional procedures, and sustainable manufacturing. For example, within connected care, Pharmacy Automation, is projected to grow toward \$1 billion, driven by partnerships like that with Henry Ford Health. BD is heavily investing in digital solutions that connect device data to improve healthcare efficiency and safety. Within drug delivery, there is a trend for self-injection including the rise of GLP drugs. BD Interventional is targeting high-burden chronic conditions, particularly in peripheral vascular disease. BD is investing in China, India, and Southeast Asia, focusing on localizing manufacturing for safety-engineered needles and point-of-care diagnostics to reduce lead times and capture market share. Investors appeared cautious about the restructured, pure-play "New BD." The results prompted analysts to consider the stock a "show-me story," where the company needs to demonstrate that its margin improvement plans and strategic, higher-growth areas can overcome current headwinds including continued pressure from China's volume-based procurement (VBP) policies which impacts about 10% of the portfolio, and rising international tariffs and changing regulatory landscapes.

United Health suffered a 19% plunge on January 27th, triggered by a "double whammy" of a lower-than-expected government Medicare reimbursement proposal and the company's first projected annual revenue decline in decades. The Centres for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) proposed a nearly flat 0.09% increase for 2027 Medicare Advantage rates. This fell significantly short of the 4% to 6% increase analysts had anticipated. United Health issued a soft outlook for 2026, forecasting revenue of at least \$439 billion. This represents a 2% year-over-year decline, the company's first projected drop since 1989, reflecting planned "right-sizing," divestitures, and a projected loss of 1.3 million to 1.4 million Medicare Advantage members. While the company met Q4 2025 adjusted earnings expectations of \$2.11 per share, its medical care ratio (MCR) reached an elevated 88.9%. This was driven by a 7.5% spike in medical utilisation and costs that outpaced previous pricing assumptions. Our thoughts:

CMS Proposal:

- The CMS proposed rate increase of 0.09% in 2027 was an unpleasant surprise because recent actions and documents had indicated a higher rate for 2027 would be likely.
- It is only a proposal at this stage. In recent years (4 of the last 5 years), it has been revised up c.100bps by the final notice in early April.
- The CMS proposed headline rate of 0.09% in 2027 rises to a total rate increase of 2.54%, when including CMS forecasts of risk coding growth. A 1% revision upwards would make the achieved rate a more respectable 3.54%.
- Why might it be revised up? The mid-term elections. The 2027 ANOC (Annual Notice of Change) would reach seniors/Medicare Advantage members in Oct (mailed out Sept 30th), right ahead of mid-terms. Not a time for an important voting cohort to be receiving double digit Medicare Advantage premium cost increases. There are c.35 million seniors enrolled in Medicare Advantage at present.
- Were it to be implemented, UNH - and all Medicare Advantage insurers - would reduce benefits offered and increase plan pricing to protect their margins. As long as they price prudently and appropriately (as this CEO has ensured in the past), they can weather the likely slower year in enrolment growth in this business line.





- Our forecasts now accommodate this more negative scenario for 2027, and a strong c.20% IRR is achievable at the current share price.

NB: At the time of writing (April 7th) the CMS has revised the Medicare Advantage rate to 2.48%.

The big picture on UNH: Ultimately, UnitedHealth Group comprises a diversified group of businesses with strong free cash flow generation characteristics and has achieved a mid-teens ROIC on average over many years - while operating in some health insurance markets prone to policy intervention. There have been and will be times when this company and its peers trade at a discount to the market due to perceived policy risk. There is no change to our view that UnitedHealth Group, under this management team, has the ability to mean revert to target margins in its insured books of business and a mid-teens ROIC.

The big picture on healthcare: the global population is expected to grow 24% by 2050, while over 60s are expected to double and over 80s triple (source: WHO). This demographic picture is particularly pronounced in developed markets like the US and will underpin healthcare costs continuing to rise above GDP for the foreseeable future. This structural growth is one of the reasons for our meaningful healthcare weighting, as well as a preponderance of excellent businesses that can benefit at high returns on capital from these trends. Industry growth has been disrupted over the last couple of years due to a confluence of unusual circumstances arising post Covid. However, the runway for attractive structural growth remains in place. Developed societies are and will continue to struggle with the increasing burden that healthcare places on their finances which can create negative headlines for the industry from time to time. However, it is our strong belief that the companies we own are part of the solution in terms of helping health systems manage costs (for example through Value Based Care) and providing products that deliver improved outcomes.

3. Current Positioning

Top 10 Portfolio Holdings

Holding	Sector	Country	Portfolio %
Vinci	Industrials	France	5.7
London Stock Exchange	Financials	United Kingdom	5.3
Amazon.com	Consumer Discretionary	United States	5.0
Safran	Industrials	France	4.8
Canadian Pacific Kansas City	Industrials	Canada	4.7
Mastercard	Financials	United States	4.7
Airbus	Industrials	France	4.5
UnitedHealth	Health Care	United States	4.5
Microsoft	Information Technology	United States	4.4
Aon PLC	Financials	United States	4.3
			47.8

Source: Veritas Asset Management LLP, as at 31 March 2026

Please refer to portfolio commentary under items 1 and 2 for further information on current positioning and outlook.





4. Responsible Investment

ESG: Environmental, Social and Governance

-  International Norms and Standards
-  Proxy Voting Report
-  Carbon Portfolio Analytics Report 

International Norms and Standards - United Nations Global Compact Screen (“UNGC”)


The United Nations Global Compact Screen (“UNGC”) identifies companies involved in controversies where the company’s alleged actions constitute a violation of one or more of the ten principles that cover environmental, anti-corruption, human rights and labour standards. The framework encourages signatories to share best practices in order to become better, more sustainable organisations.

On a monthly basis, utilising MSCI ESG Research data and an alert system, Veritas reviews all investee companies to determine if a company fails any of the global compact principles. If there are notable changes during the month, our system will distribute an email alert to the Investment Team, Compliance Team, and ESG Team. Veritas will identify which principle has been violated, assess the materiality of the violation, and engage with the business if required.

Fail	➔	The company is implicated in one or more controversy cases where there are credible allegations that the company or its management inflicted serious large-scale harm in violation of global norms.
Watch List	➔	The company is implicated in one or more controversy cases that are serious and warrant ongoing monitoring. However, based on information available to date, it does not constitute a significant breach of global norms according to the methodology.
Pass	➔	According to the methodology, the company has not been implicated in any controversy case constituting a significant breach of global norms within the last three years.

As illustrated in the diagram below, during the three months to 31 March 26, 0% of companies held in the Fund "Failed" the UN Global Compact screen. Three companies in the Fund (13.1%) were listed on the Global Compact "Watchlist". For example, Unilever Plc, is listed on the watchlist for a potential breach of **Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges**, criticism from several environmental protection groups and development agencies for its alleged contribution to global plastic pollution through the manufacture and sale of its products. Veritas will continue to monitor the company's progress in this area. Should this flag escalate to a "Fail", we will have cause to engage.





Additional Global Norms Framework Violations (%)¹

Human Rights Norms Violation (%)	0.0%	0.1%	-0.1%
Human Rights Norms Violation or Watch List (%)	14.0%	11.1%	2.9%
Labor Norms (%)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Labor Norms Violation or Watch List (%)	5.1%	5.9%	-0.8%

¹ The table includes the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (“UNGP”) and the International Labour Organization’s Fundamental Principles (“ILO”) Data Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC. Data as at 31 March 2026.





Proxy Voting



As long-term equity investors, we vote all resolutions in the best interests of shareholders

Veritas is committed to evaluating and voting proxy resolutions in our clients' best interests. We will vote on all proxy proposals, amendments, consents, or resolutions. We will vote against management where we firmly believe doing so is in the client's best interests. This will primarily occur where the matter to be voted upon will affect shareholder value.

Our Voting Policy is made up of two parts, one of which is ESG specific. We vote on all resolutions and our third-party proxy advisor, Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS"), will provide vote recommendations and vote execution services. We also follow a custom ESG Red Line policy. The Red Lines contain 29 guidelines covering topics associated with ESG.

Where a red line is breached, the ESG vote recommendation will take precedence over the standard policy recommendation. If we choose not to vote against management, we will explain the rationale for why not (comply or explain). Often, we will set management targets in writing and agree a timeline for these to be achieved. We will then vote with management but explain that if the targets are not met, we will vote against them at the next Annual General Meeting ("AGM").

The first section of this report details the overall votes cast and the breakdown of these votes. In cases where we voted "AGAINST" management, rationale is provided.

During the period there were 4 meetings and 54 votable resolutions across the companies: Becton, Dickinson and Company, Compass Group Plc, TransDigm Group Incorporated and Waters Corporation.

Voting statistics	
Meetings voted	4
Votes Cast	54
Votes "FOR" Management	49
Votes "AGAINST" Management	5

Votes by country	%	
United Kingdom	55.6	
United States	44.4	

Votes by Industry sector ¹	%	
Life Sciences Tools & Services	3.7	
Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure	44.4	
Health Care Equipment & Supplies	29.6	
Aerospace & Defense	22.2	

- "FOR" Management
- "AGAINST" Management

¹ Votes by Industry Sector uses the Global Industry Classification Standard ("GICs") coding level 3 "Industry" classification. Source: Veritas Asset Management/ISS





Proxy Voting – Vote Statistics

VAM LLP Rationale – Votes “AGAINST” Management Recommendation

Report Item	Company	Country	Sector	Proposal	Management Vote Recommendation	VAM LLP Vote	Voter Rationale
1	Becton, Dickinson and Company	United States	Health care	Director election	“FOR”	“AGAINST”	A vote AGAINST the management recommendation is warranted as it breaches the following Red Lines: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Red Line S4: The level of gender diversity on board is below 40% and has not improved compared to the previous year. - Red Line S4: Within senior leadership positions, none of the roles of Chair, CEO, Chief Financial Officer and senior independent director are held by women.
2	Compass Group Plc	United Kingdom	Consumer Discretionary	Authorise Issue of Equity without Pre-emptive Rights	“FOR”	“AGAINST”	A vote AGAINST the management recommendation is warranted as it breaches the following Red Lines: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Red Line G15: The resolution requests the disapplication of pre-emptive rights. Since it asks for disapplication of pre-emption rights for stock issuance up to 10% for general use, which is above our 5% Red Line threshold.


Proxy Voting – ESG Red Lines

The second part of the voting report focuses on the custom Red Line element of our policy.

Across the 54 resolutions voted during the period, the overall number of resolutions which triggered the Red Line element of our customised policy was 10. We voted in line (“FOR”) on 5 resolutions and contrary to (“AGAINST”) for the remaining 5 resolutions. In keeping with the AMNT requirement to either comply or explain, please see below rationale examples where votes cast have resulted in a vote “Contrary to” the Red Line element of our policy. Should you require further examples of rationale please contact us directly.

Votes “FOR” and “AGAINST” VAM LLP Policy

Votes	Red line ¹	Total
Number of votes “FOR” Policy	5	49
Number of votes “AGAINST” Policy	5	5
Total	10	54



¹ Number of Red Lines triggered and votes “FOR” or “AGAINST”.





Carbon Portfolio Analytics


Carbon Portfolio Analysis – Overview

	Carbon Footprint				
	Carbon Emissions	Total Carbon Emissions*	Carbon Intensity	Weighted Average Carbon Intensity	Carbon Emissions Data Availability
Nedgroup Global Equity Fund	12.9	16,191	28.7	50.6	100.0%
MSCI World	40.6	3,334,063,683	110.8	104.3	99.9%
	t CO2e / \$M Invested	t CO2e	t CO2e / \$M Sales		Market Value



This report analyzes a portfolio of securities in terms of the carbon emissions, fossil fuel reserves, and other carbon carbon-related characteristics of the entities that issue those securities. It compares this data to the performance of a portfolio replicating a market benchmark. The data below represents a high-level subset of the information found in the following pages.

MSCI ESG Research defines portfolio carbon footprint as the carbon emissions of a portfolio per \$million invested. Additional headline metrics provided in the table to the left include an absolute figure for portfolio carbon emissions and two intensity measures: portfolio carbon intensity measures the carbon efficiency of a portfolio and is defined as the total carbon emissions of the portfolio per \$million of portfolio sales, while weighted average carbon intensity is a measure of a portfolio's exposure to carbon-related potential market and regulatory risks and is computed as the sum product of the portfolio companies' carbon intensities and weights. More information on these metrics is included in the appendix.

*Based on Portfolio Investment of \$1,257,668,535 and Benchmark 1 Investment of \$82,148,381,485,483




The Nedgroup Global Equity Fund portfolio Carbon Emissions are 68.3% lower than the MSCI World, Carbon Intensity is 74.1% lower, and Weighted Average Carbon Intensity is 51.5% lower. (Pages 3, 5 and 6)



The Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, and Communication Services sectors in the Nedgroup Global Equity Fund portfolio contribute 38.8% of the weight versus 84.1% of the carbon emissions. (Page 3)



The Nedgroup Global Equity Fund portfolio is 7% underweight, relative to the MSCI World, in companies that own Fossil Fuel Reserves, and 17.3% underweight in companies offering Clean Technologies Solutions. (Pages 8 and 13)



3.9% of the weight of the Nedgroup Global Equity Fund portfolio has Aggressive Efforts in Use of Cleaner Energy Sources, but 0.3% has No Efforts in Carbon Reduction Targets. (Page 12)

Data as at 31 March 2026.

Source: MSCI, Veritas Asset Management LLP

Carbon Footprint – Carbon Emissions

The timeline compares the historical and most recent emissions of the portfolio to the benchmarks based on the current constituents and weights of each.


The column chart in the lower right shows the composition by sector of the portfolio and benchmarks by market capitalization as well as by each sector's contribution to emissions. This highlights that dominant sectors, in terms of emissions, tend to be Energy, Utilities, and Materials.

The sector table shows the comparison of the portfolio sector emissions to those of each benchmark.

The attribution analysis presented on the next page evaluates how stock selection and sector weighting drive the portfolio carbon footprint versus the benchmarks.


The company tables on the following page show emissions in two ways: 1) total emissions of the companies whose securities are in the portfolio, which provides an order of magnitude in an absolute sense, and 2) contribution of companies to the portfolio-level emissions. The tables also indicate whether the emissions data is reported or estimated, and how each company performs on Carbon Risk Management relative to peers.

Carbon Emissions Trend of Current Holdings



*Reflects most recently available data for each company on the date of running the report.

Type of Emissions as Percent of Contribution




Carbon Emissions by Sector	Nedgroup Global Equity Fund	MSCI World
	t CO2e/\$M Invested	
Communication Services	48.3	4.3
Consumer Discretionary	32.6	13.7
Industrials	22.8	33.5
Consumer Staples	11.4	24.5
Health Care	3.7	3.7
Information Technology	1.7	2.3
Financials	0.7	4.0
Real Estate	N/A	10.1
Utilities	N/A	403.9
Materials	N/A	281.7
Energy	N/A	209.5
Overall	12.9	40.6

Key: 0 to 40 t CO2e/\$M Invested

Nedgroup Global Equity Fund vs MSCI World

Comparison of t CO2e/\$M Invested
1026.4%
137.8%
-31.8%
-53.3%
1.9%
-24.6%
-81.9%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-68.3%

Sector Weight vs Contribution to Emissions



Data as at 31 March 2026.

Source: MSCI, Veritas Asset Management LLP





Carbon Footprint – Carbon Emissions (Attribution Analysis and Key Holdings)

Nedgroup Global Equity Fund vs MSCI World	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Portfolio Carbon Emissions	Benchmark Carbon Emissions	Absolute Attribution				Percentage Attribution			
					Sector Allocation	Stock Selection	Interaction	Total	Sector Allocation	Stock Selection	Interaction	Total
Information Technology	15.3%	-10.5%	1.7	2.3	4.0	-0.1	0.1	3.9	9.9%	-0.4%	0.1%	9.6%
Communication Services	2.4%	-6.1%	48.3	4.3	2.2	3.7	-2.7	3.3	5.5%	9.2%	-6.6%	8.1%
Consumer Discretionary	13.8%	4.6%	32.6	13.7	-1.2	1.8	0.9	1.4	-3.0%	4.3%	2.1%	3.4%
Real Estate	0.0%	-1.8%	N/A	10.1	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%
Financials	17.7%	1.4%	0.7	4.0	-0.5	-0.5	0.0	-1.1	-1.3%	-1.3%	-0.1%	-2.7%
Consumer Staples	7.8%	2.1%	11.4	24.5	-0.3	-0.7	-0.3	-1.4	-0.9%	-1.8%	-0.7%	-3.4%
Industrials	22.6%	10.8%	22.8	33.5	-0.8	-1.3	-1.1	-3.2	-1.9%	-3.1%	-2.8%	-7.8%
Health Care	25.4%	10.8%	3.7	3.7	-4.0	0.0	0.0	-4.0	-9.8%	0.0%	0.0%	-9.8%
Energy	0.0%	-4.7%	N/A	209.5	-7.9	0.0	0.0	-7.9	-13.6%	0.0%	0.0%	-13.6%
Materials	0.0%	-3.6%	N/A	281.7	-8.8	0.0	0.0	-8.8	-21.6%	0.0%	0.0%	-21.6%
Utilities	0.0%	-2.9%	N/A	403.9	-10.5	0.0	0.0	-10.5	-26.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-26.0%
Total	100%		12.9	40.6	-27.3	2.8	-3.2	-27.7	-47.3%	7.0%	-8.0%	-48.3%

Portfolio Issuers with Highest Carbon Emissions									
Company	Sector	Country	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Carbon Emissions (t CO2e)	Contribution to Portfolio Emissions	Carbon Emissions Source	Carbon Risk Management	
1 AMAZON.COM, INC.	Consumer Disc	United States of America	5.34%	2.62%	17,930,000	3.14%	Reported	Low	
2 MICROSOFT CORPORATION	Info Tech	United States of America	4.51%	1.23%	10,098,878	1.28%	Reported	Modest	
3 CANADIAN PACIFIC KANSAS CITY LTD	Industrials	Canada	4.88%	4.79%	4,705,037	24.97%	Reported	Modest	
4 VINCI SA	Industrials	France	5.82%	5.73%	2,272,000	11.62%	Reported	Modest	
5 HYATT HOTELS CORPORATION	Consumer Disc	United States of America	2.52%	2.51%	2,173,573	30.88%	Reported	Modest	
6 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.	Comm Svcs	United States of America	2.40%	2.38%	1,500,947	9.01%	Reported	Low	
7 ARBUS SE	Industrials	Netherlands	4.65%	4.51%	769,000	1.84%	Reported	Modest	
8 THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INCORPORATED	Health Care	United States of America	3.80%	3.57%	767,525	1.25%	Reported	Modest	
9 UNILEVER PLC	Consumer Staples	United Kingdom	3.89%	3.74%	690,000	1.73%	Reported	Modest	
10 THE MAGNUM ICE CREAM COMPANY N.V.	Consumer Staples	Netherlands	0.31%	0.30%	598,668	1.63%	Estimated	Minimal	
Top 10 Companies			37.93%			87.34%			

Largest Contributors to Portfolio Emissions									
Company	Sector	Country	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Carbon Emissions	Contribution to Portfolio Emissions	Carbon Emissions Source	Carbon Risk Management	
1 HYATT HOTELS CORPORATION	Consumer Disc	United States of America	2.52%	2.51%	2,173,573	30.88%	Reported	Modest	
2 CANADIAN PACIFIC KANSAS CITY LTD	Industrials	Canada	4.88%	4.79%	4,705,037	24.97%	Reported	Modest	
3 VINCI SA	Industrials	France	5.82%	5.73%	2,272,000	11.62%	Reported	Modest	
4 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.	Comm Svcs	United States of America	2.40%	2.38%	1,500,947	9.01%	Reported	Low	
5 DIAO PLC	Consumer Staples	United Kingdom	3.61%	3.56%	521,000	3.57%	Reported	Modest	
6 AMAZON.COM, INC.	Consumer Disc	United States of America	5.34%	2.62%	17,930,000	3.14%	Reported	Low	
7 BECTON, DICKINSON AND COMPANY	Health Care	United States of America	4.02%	3.97%	390,982	2.76%	Reported	Modest	
8 ARBUS SE	Industrials	Netherlands	4.65%	4.51%	769,000	1.84%	Reported	Modest	
9 UNILEVER PLC	Consumer Staples	United Kingdom	3.89%	3.74%	690,000	1.73%	Reported	Modest	
10 THE MAGNUM ICE CREAM COMPANY N.V.	Consumer Staples	Netherlands	0.31%	0.30%	598,668	1.63%	Estimated	Minimal	
Top 10 Contributors			37.25%			91.14%			

*Security weight in Nedgroup Global Equity Fund relative to security weight in MSCI World

Data as at 31 March 2026.

Source: MSCI, Veritas Asset Management LLP

Carbon Risk (Weighted Average Carbon Intensity)

Carbon Intensity measures the carbon efficiency of a company as total carbon emissions normalized by total sales. At a portfolio level, carbon intensity is the ratio of portfolio carbon emissions normalized by the investor's claims on sales. This method expresses portfolio carbon efficiency and allows investors to know how many emissions per dollar of sales are generated from their investment.



The timeline below compares the historical and most recent Carbon Intensity of the portfolio to the benchmarks based on the current constituents and weights of each. The table and chart to the right show sector weights and Carbon Intensity levels.

The attribution analysis presented on the next page evaluates how stock selection and sector weighting drive the portfolio carbon footprint versus the benchmarks.

Carbon Intensity by Sector	Nedgroup Global Equity Fund		MSCI World	
	Weight	t CO2e/\$M Sales	Weight	t CO2e/\$M Sales
Consumer Discretionary	13.8%	85.0	9.3%	26.8
Industrials	22.6%	56.8	11.8%	84.9
Communication Services	2.4%	27.5	8.5%	18.2
Consumer Staples	7.8%	21.0	5.7%	38.0
Information Technology	15.3%	11.6	25.7%	21.6
Financials	17.7%	4.8	16.3%	8.6
Health Care	20.4%	4.5	9.7%	7.4
Utilities	0.0%	N/A	2.9%	990.9
Materials	0.0%	N/A	3.6%	573.5
Real Estate	0.0%	N/A	1.8%	54.9
Energy	0.0%	N/A	4.7%	318.6
Overall	100%	28.7	100%	110.8

Key: 990.9 (red), 110.8 (green), 0 (blue)

Nedgroup Global Equity Fund vs MSCI World	
Comparison of t CO2e/\$M Sales	
216.7%	
-33.1%	
51.1%	
-44.7%	
-46.6%	
-44.4%	
-39.8%	
N/A	
N/A	
N/A	
N/A	
-74.1%	



Data as at 31 March 2026.

Source: MSCI, Veritas Asset Management LLP





Carbon Efficiency (Carbon Intensity)


Carbon Intensity allows comparison of emissions across companies of different sizes and in different industries. At a company level, MSCI ESG Research calculates Carbon Intensity as carbon emissions per dollar of sales. The portfolio-level Weighted Average Carbon Intensity is the sum product of the constituent weights and intensities.

The timeline below compares the historical and most recent Weighted Average Carbon Intensity of the portfolio to the benchmarks based on the current constituents and weights of each. The table to the right shows sector weights and Weighted Average Carbon Intensity. And the column chart shows the composition by sector of the portfolio and benchmarks by market capitalization as well as by each sector's contribution to the Weighted Average Carbon Intensity.


The company tables on the following page show Carbon Intensity in two ways: 1) portfolio issuers with the highest Carbon Intensity, and 2) contribution of companies to the portfolio-level Weighted Average Carbon Intensity. The tables also indicate whether the emissions data is reported or estimated, and how each company performs on Carbon Risk Management relative to peers.

Weighted Average Carbon Intensity by Sector	Nedgroup Global Equity Fund	MSCI World	Nedgroup Global Equity Fund vs MSCI World Comparison of tCO2e/\$M Sales
	tCO2e/\$M Sales		
Consumer Discretionary	120.3	39.6	203.8%
Industrials	115.9	75.0	54.6%
Communication Services	27.5	10.4	164.2%
Consumer Staples	19.5	32.7	-40.3%
Information Technology	15.6	20.6	-24.6%
Health Care	11.8	12.5	-5.3%
Financials	8.4	10.9	-59.2%
Utilities	N/A	1,309.2	N/A
Materials	N/A	576.9	N/A
Real Estate	N/A	83.4	N/A
Energy	N/A	429.5	N/A
Overall	50.6	104.3	-51.5%

Key: 1,309.2 104.3 0



*Reflects the most recently available data for each company on the date of running the report




Data as at 31 March 2026.

Source: MSCI, Veritas Asset Management LLP

Carbon Risk (Attribution Analysis and Key Holdings)

Nedgroup Global Equity Fund vs MSCI World	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Portfolio Wtd Ave Intensity	Benchmark Wtd Ave Intensity
Consumer Discretionary	13.8%	4.6%	120.3	39.6
Information Technology	15.3%	-10.4%	15.6	20.6
Communication Services	2.4%	-6.1%	27.5	10.4
Industrials	22.4%	10.8%	115.9	75.0
Real Estate	0.0%	-1.8%	N/A	83.4
Financials	17.7%	1.4%	4.4	10.9
Consumer Staples	7.8%	2.1%	19.5	32.7
Health Care	20.4%	10.8%	11.8	12.5
Energy	0.0%	-4.7%	N/A	429.5
Materials	0.0%	-3.6%	N/A	576.9
Utilities	0.0%	-2.9%	N/A	1,309.2
Total	100%		50.6	104.3

Absolute Attribution				Percentage Attribution			
Sector Allocation	Stock Selection	Interaction	Total	Sector Allocation	Stock Selection	Interaction	Total
-2.9	7.5	3.7	8.2	-2.8%	7.2%	3.5%	7.9%
8.7	-1.3	0.5	8.0	8.4%	-1.3%	0.5%	7.6%
5.7	1.5	-1.0	6.2	5.5%	1.4%	-1.0%	5.9%
-3.2	4.8	4.4	6.1	-3.0%	4.6%	4.2%	5.8%
0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%
-1.3	-1.0	-0.1	-2.4	-1.3%	-1.0%	-0.1%	-2.3%
-1.5	-0.7	-0.3	-2.6	-1.5%	-0.7%	-0.3%	-2.5%
-9.9	-0.1	-0.1	-10.0	-9.9%	-0.1%	-0.1%	-9.6%
-15.3	0.0	0.0	-15.3	-14.7%	0.0%	0.0%	-14.7%
-17.2	0.0	0.0	-17.2	-16.5%	0.0%	0.0%	-16.5%
-38.0	0.0	0.0	-38.0	-33.6%	0.0%	0.0%	-33.6%
-71.5	10.6	7.1	-53.8	-68.5%	10.2%	6.8%	-51.5%



Portfolio Issuers with Highest Carbon Intensity									
Company	Sector	Country	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Carbon Intensity	Contribution to Wtd Ave Carbon Intensity	Total Carbon Emissions	Source	Carbon Risk Management
1 HIATT HOTELS CORPORATION	Consumer Disc	United States of America	2.52%	2.51%	595	29.65%	Reported	Modest	
2 CANADIAN PACIFIC KANSASCITY LTD	Industrials	Canada	4.88%	4.79%	465	44.87%	Reported	Modest	
3 THE MAGNUM ICE CREAM COMPANY N.V.	Consumer Staples	Netherlands	0.31%	0.30%	73	0.44%	Estimated	Minimal	
4 MICROSOFT CORPORATION	Info Tech	United States of America	4.51%	1.23%	41	3.68%	Reported	Modest	
5 VNCI SA	Industrials	France	5.82%	5.73%	30	3.49%	Reported	Modest	
6 AMAZON.COM, INC.	Consumer Disc	United States of America	5.14%	2.62%	28	2.86%	Reported	Low	
7 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.	Comm Svcs	United States of America	2.40%	2.38%	27	1.30%	Reported	Low	
8 DIAGEO PLC	Consumer Staples	United Kingdom	3.61%	3.56%	24	1.74%	Reported	Modest	
9 ZOETIS INC.	Health Care	United States of America	2.02%	1.95%	24	0.94%	Reported	Modest	
10 BECTON, DICKINSON AND COMPANY	Health Care	United States of America	4.02%	3.97%	19	1.54%	Reported	Modest	
Top 10 Companies			35.24%			90.50%			

Largest Contributors to the Portfolio's Weighted Average Carbon Intensity									
Company	Sector	Country	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Carbon Intensity	Contribution to Wtd Ave Carbon Intensity	Total Carbon Emissions	Source	Carbon Risk Management
1 CANADIAN PACIFIC KANSASCITY LTD	Industrials	Canada	4.88%	4.79%	465	44.87%	Reported	Modest	
2 HIATT HOTELS CORPORATION	Consumer Disc	United States of America	2.52%	2.51%	595	29.65%	Reported	Modest	
3 MICROSOFT CORPORATION	Info Tech	United States of America	4.51%	1.23%	41	3.68%	Reported	Modest	
4 VNCI SA	Industrials	France	5.82%	5.73%	30	3.49%	Reported	Modest	
5 AMAZON.COM, INC.	Consumer Disc	United States of America	5.14%	2.62%	28	2.86%	Reported	Low	
6 DIAGEO PLC	Consumer Staples	United Kingdom	3.61%	3.56%	24	1.74%	Reported	Modest	
7 SAFRAN SA	Industrials	France	4.90%	4.76%	16	1.59%	Reported	Modest	
8 BECTON, DICKINSON AND COMPANY	Health Care	United States of America	4.02%	3.97%	19	1.54%	Reported	Modest	
9 THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INCORPORATED	Health Care	United States of America	3.80%	3.57%	18	1.35%	Reported	Modest	
10 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.	Comm Svcs	United States of America	2.40%	2.38%	27	1.30%	Reported	Low	
Top 10 Contributors			41.62%			92.06%			

*Security weight in Nedgroup Global Equity Fund relative to security weight in MSCI World

Data as at 31 March 2026.

Source: MSCI, Veritas Asset Management LLP






Carbon Risk Management (Key Holdings)

As part of the MSCI ESG Ratings model, we analyze a number of Key Issues, including Carbon Emissions. Assessment data for this issue is available for all companies for which we have determined that carbon presents material risks as well as for all companies on the MSCI World Index.

Assessment of carbon management includes a look at emissions intensity trend and performance relative to industry peers as well as the company's reduction targets (if any) and mitigation efforts. The chart to the right shows the market value percentage of companies with robust, modest, low, and minimal efforts to manage carbon emissions.



Company	Sector	Country	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Carbon Risk Management Score	Carbon Risk Management	Carbon Intensity
1 VINCI SA	Industrials	France	5.82%	5.73%	7.0	Modest	30.3
2 LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GRO	Financials	United Kingdom	5.44%	5.37%	6.3	Modest	6.8
3 AMAZON.COM, INC.	Consumer Disc	United States of America	5.14%	2.62%	3.8	Low	28.1
4 SAFRAN SA	Industrials	France	4.90%	4.76%	6.8	Modest	16.4
5 CANADIAN PACIFIC KANSAS C	Industrials	Canada	4.88%	4.79%	5.2	Modest	465.2

Company	Sector	Country	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Carbon Risk Management Score	Carbon Risk Management	Carbon Intensity
1 THE MAGNUM ICE CREAM COMP	Consumer Staples	Netherlands	0.31%	0.30%	1.0	Minimal	72.8
2 AMAZON.COM, INC.	Consumer Disc	United States of America	5.14%	2.62%	3.8	Low	28.1
3 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, I	Comm Svcs	United States of America	2.40%	2.38%	4.3	Low	27.5
4 INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE	Financials	United States of America	2.94%	2.83%	4.3	Low	6.3
5 TRANSNIGM GROUP INCORPORA	Industrials	United States of America	2.33%	2.25%	5.1	Modest	17.5

Company	Sector	Country	Portfolio Weight	Active Weight*	Carbon Risk Management Score	Carbon Risk Management	Carbon Intensity
1 ASML HOLDING N.V.	Info Tech	Netherlands	2.26%	1.63%	8.5	Robust	1.1
2 COMPASS GROUP PLC	Consumer Disc	United Kingdom	2.58%	2.52%	7.8	Robust	4.8
3 DASSAULT SYSTEMES SE	Info Tech	France	2.06%	2.05%	7.3	Modest	0.9
4 AIRBUS SE	Industrials	Netherlands	4.65%	4.51%	7.3	Modest	10.7
5 WATERS CORPORATION	Health Care	United States of America	3.57%	3.54%	7.1	Modest	11.8

*Security weight in Nedgroup Global Equity Fund relative to security weight in MSCI World

Data as at 31 March 2026.

Source: MSCI, Veritas Asset Management LLP



Opportunities (Clean Technology Solutions)

MSCI ESG Research analyzes companies involved in clean technology solutions based on their sales in the following categories: Alternative Energy, Energy Efficiency, Green Building, Pollution Prevention, and Sustainable Water. The table and chart show the percent of the portfolio and benchmarks that are represented by companies with sales from these activities. Also included are the top ten holdings of the portfolio based on the estimated percent of revenue from these activities.

	Nedgroup Global Equity Fund	MSCI World
Theme		
Alternative Energy	5.8%	14.0%
Energy Efficiency	27.8%	38.3%
Green Building	5.8%	2.5%
Pollution Prevention	5.8%	5.1%
Sustainable Agriculture	0.0%	0.3%
Sustainable Water	5.8%	4.4%
Estimated Revenue Generated		
Any Strategy	27.8%	45.0%
>50% - 100%	0.0%	7.3%
>20% - 50%	7.3%	7.3%
>0% - 20%	20.7%	30.4%
Any Revenue	27.8%	45.0%

Company	Sector	Country	Portfolio Weight	Clean Technology Solution	Estimated Revenue from Clean Tech
1 SAP SE	Info Tech	Germany	2.56%	Energy Efficiency	29%
2 MICROSOFT CORPORATION	Info Tech	United States of America	4.51%	Energy Efficiency	21%
3 SALESFORCE, INC.	Info Tech	United States of America	3.87%	Energy Efficiency	19%
4 VINCI SA	Industrials	France	5.82%	Green Building	19%
5 DASSAULT SYSTEMES SE	Info Tech	France	2.06%	Energy Efficiency	9%
6 AMAZON.COM, INC.	Consumer Disc	United States of America	5.14%	Energy Efficiency	8%
7 THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC I	Health Care	United States of America	3.80%	Energy Efficiency	2%
8 LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GRO	Financials	United Kingdom	5.44%	Alternative Energy	0%
9 SAFRAN SA	Industrials	France	4.90%	Alternative Energy	0%
10 CANADIAN PACIFIC KANSAS CI	Industrials	Canada	4.88%	Alternative Energy	0%

Portfolio Weight Grouped by Estimated Revenue Generated from Clean Technology Solutions



Data as at 31 March 2026.

Source: MSCI, Veritas Asset Management LLP





Disclaimer

This is a marketing communication. Please refer to the prospectus, the key investor information documents (the **KIIDs/PRIIPS KIDs**) and the financial statements of Nedgroup Investments Funds plc (the **Fund**) before making any final investment decisions.

These documents are available from Nedgroup Investments (IOM) Ltd (the **Investment Manager**) or via the website: www.nedgroupinvestments.com, where the prospectus is available in English and the KIIDs/KIDs in English and the official languages of each country of registration.

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The Fund is authorised and regulated in Ireland by the Central Bank of Ireland. The Fund is authorised as a UCITS pursuant to the European Communities (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) Regulations 2011 as amended and as may be amended, supplemented, or consolidated from time -to-time and any rules, guidance or notices made by the Central Bank which are applicable to the Fund. The Fund is domiciled in Ireland. Nedgroup Investment (IOM) Limited (reg no 57917C), the Investment Manager and Distributor of the Fund, is licensed by the Isle of Man Financial Services Authority. The Depositary of the Fund is Citi Depositary Services Ireland DAC, 1 North Wall Quay, Dublin 1, Ireland. The Administrator of the Fund is Citibank Europe plc, 1 North Wall Quay, Dublin 1, Ireland.

The sub-funds of the Fund (the **Sub-Funds**) are generally medium to long-term investments and the Investment Manager does not guarantee the performance of an investor's investment and even if forecasts about the expected future performance are included the investor will carry the investment and market risk, which includes the possibility of losing capital.

The price of shares may go down or up depending on fluctuations in financial markets outside of the control of the Investment Manager meaning an investor may not get back the amount invested.

Past performance is not indicative of future performance and does not predict future returns.

Risks and fees are outlined in the relevant Sub-Fund supplement.

Prices are published on the Investment Manager's website.

Distribution: The prospectus, the supplements, the KIIDs/PRIIPS KIDs, constitution, country specific appendix as well as the annual and semi-annual reports may be obtained free of charge in English for the prospectus and in English together with the relevant local languages for the KIIDs/KIDs from the country representative, the Investment Manager, or at www.nedgroupinvestments.com. The Investment Manager may decide to terminate the arrangements made for the marketing of its collective investment undertakings in accordance with Art 93a of Directive 2009/65/EC and Art 32a of Directive 2011/61/EU.

U.K: Nedgroup Investments (UK) Limited (reg no 2627187), authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, is the facilities agent. The Fund and certain of its sub-funds are recognised in accordance with Section 264 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.

Isle of Man: The Fund has been recognised under para 1 sch 4 of the Collective Investments Schemes Act 2008 of the Isle of Man. Isle of Man investors are not protected by statutory compensation arrangements in respect of the Fund.

NEDGROUP INVESTMENTS CONTACT DETAILS

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For further information on the fund please visit: www.nedgroupinvestments.com

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